Sweden, the League of Armed Neutrality and the
first Battle of Copenhagen
by Kester Bathgate
An uneasy alliance between century old enemies that could have jeopardized the outcome of the Napoleonic wars.
On 30th March 1801, a British fleet passed
through the Sound, the stretch of water separating Sweden from Denmark.
Commanded by Admiral Sir Hyde Parker and Vice-Admiral Horatio Nelson the ships,
having earlier anchored to give diplomacy a fleeting chance, were on their way
to attack the Danish Fleet at Copenhagen and confront the so-called League of Armed
Neutrality formed by the Northern Powers. As they passed Shakespeare’s famed
Elsinore Castle, guarding the narrowest part of the Sound, the Danes opened
fire – a fact that Colonel Stewart, in command of the troops aboard the fleet,
described in his journal of the Baltic campaign thus: ’The Danish batteries
opened a fire, as we understood, of nearly 100 pieces of cannon and mortars, as
soon as our leading ship, the Monarch, came abreast of them; and they continued
in one uninterrupted blaze during the passage of the Fleet, to the no small
amusement of our crews…’ (1) He also seemed surprised that the Swedish defences
remained silent: ’It had been our intention to have kept in mid-channel, the
forbearance of the Swedes not having been counted upon, the lighter vessels
were on the larboard side of our Line of Battle, and were to have engaged the
Helsingburg shore: not a shot, however, was fired, nor any batteries apparent… ’(2)
Although a member of the same League the fact that Sweden offered no response
to the British fleet, unlike her more belligerent neighbour across the
Kattegat, perhaps indicated other considerations.
Historically, there has always been mutual
hostility between the two Scandinavian nations, which perhaps today is seen at
its most aggressive in football matches – and at its mildest, in numerous jokes. From mediaeval times, the Danes have demanded Sound
dues from the ships of other nations that passed through the Öresund, naturally
including those of Sweden. Thus in 1810 work was begun on the Göta Canal, which
crosses the country from Gothenburg to the Baltic coast, in order to circumvent
this problem. However, it did not open until 1832 and was never used as
originally intended, it being used peacefully today by yachtsmen and tourists.
Great Britain had been starkly reminded of the
situation in August 1800, when a squadron under Vice Admiral Dickson found its
way barred from entering the Sound, by four Danish warships anchored across its
mouth. These subsequently retreated to guard Copenhagen although Dickson and
the then British Minister, Lord Whitworth, were able to land and discuss the tense
situation between the two countries. This had not been helped by the capture of
a Danish warship, the Freya, and her convoy by a British force in the English
Channel earlier in July. Although the repaired frigate was duly returned and
something of a settlement had been patched up, the stalemate was not to last.
The ”bear” in the east
On Sweden’s eastern side is her other near neighbour
and traditional enemy, Russia, which historically has probably been of greater
concern than Denmark. Confrontation with the Russian ‘bear’ has also been
on-going throughout Swedish history and largely concerned the eastern province
of Finland, which has been fought over by both sides and which only became an
independent state in 1917. In 1788 the Swedish King, Gustav III (1746–1792), had
decided to re-open wounds by engaging in yet another tussle with the old
adversary. Although the conflict held some victories for the Swedes, notably
the battle of Svensksund in 1790, the war overall did much to ruin the
country’s already poor economy. Even more disastrously his son, the unstable
Gustav IV Adolph (1778–1837), embroiled Sweden in yet another conflict which
resulted in her finally losing Finland to her enemy in 1809. (The 200th
anniversary of Finland’s loss was jointly marked in 2009, by events held in both
countries.) In the coup that followed this calamity Gustav was first arrested
then exiled to Germany, the throne being assumed by his elderly and legally childless
uncle, who ruled as Charles XIII (1748-1818). The succession was subsequently
offered to the renegade French Marshal Bernadotte (1763-1844) the election,
very likely in part, being influenced by his personal fortune. Initially he
became Regent in 1810, and acceded to the throne in 1818 as Karl Johan XIV,
thereby initiating the present royal line. Wisely Bernadotte did not, as many
Swedes had hoped, renew hostilities with Russia to regain Finland, but later took
Norway from Denmark as part compensation. (Finland’s loss was long to remain a
thorn and, even during the Second World War, many Swedes actively supported the
Finns in their struggle against Russian domination, rather than fight Nazi
Germany.)
The League of Armed Neutrality
In the December of 1800, as had briefly
happened in 1780, Denmark (which then included Norway) and Sweden joined in an
uneasy alliance with Russia, the so-called League of Armed Neutrality. Primarily
its aim was to stop Great Britain’s long-standing and vital trade in naval
stores, without which it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for
her to maintain the fleet. The threat, naturally, could not go unanswered, but
one wonders whether any of the northern powers seriously imagined any retaliation,
perhaps believing themselves secure in their French-backed alliance. A later
Nelson scholar wittily observed: ‘By an extraordinary coincidence, the crowned
heads of three of the northern countries banded together in a Confederation
directed against Great Britain were insane, and the fourth, Frederick William III
of Prussia, was a character so amiably indecisive as to be personably negligible’.
(3) Despite their historic differences, Denmark and Sweden also co-operated
because of the rigorous stop-and-search policy being carried out by the Royal
Navy on their merchant ships, suspected of and indeed in many cases found to be,
carrying war materials to France. Both nations simply maintained that they were
neutral in the conflict between Britain and France and were but attempting to
carry on their trading activities as normal. This, however, was not how it was
seen by Great Britain.
The trade of the Baltic region was an important
factor in the equation. Besides the existing trading links with most of the Scandinavian
countries and Great Britain, which a war would naturally disrupt, there was
also trade between these countries and the rest of the world. Sweden, because
of her geographical position, was perhaps the most trade-dependant of the
Baltic nations and, like Great Britain, imported a large number of necessities
and luxury goods. She thus had a small but important merchant marine, which
included a prestigious East India Company, the SOIC. Since its formation in
1731 the Company had had important trade links with China and the Far East,
importing tea, silk and fine porcelain, much of the tea being re-exported to
Great Britain. As with the other northern countries, Sweden also exported many
items used in shipbuilding, specifically resin, turpentine and Stockholm tar.
Her most significant product however, was iron ore. Sweden was famed not only
for large deposits of the mineral but also for its high quality, which, amongst
other things, was used in the manufacture of superior cannon. Small wonder
therefore, that Great Britain wished to prevent trade in these goods with her
enemy.
A tree to be taken down
Fear and simple geography also played a part in
membership of the League. Sweden, which was separated by the Baltic and thus to
some extent somewhat isolated from mainland Europe, was perhaps less wary of
France than Russia, whilst Denmark’s connection with the continent made her rather
more in awe of Napoleon Bonaparte. Russia however, had another and very different
reason for being involved. Not only was the Czar, Paul, a fervent admirer of
the French Emperor but his plans had also been thwarted by Great Britain, who
had refused to cede Malta to him, when the French had been ousted from the
island in 1800. Thus Russia became the leading force in the alliance, whilst
Denmark, Sweden and Prussia were uneasy partners. It was not surprising,
therefore, that the Northern Powers did not in reality present the united
cohesion that the term ‘League of Armed Neutrality’ might suggest.
… I look upon the Northern League to be like a tree, of which Paul was the trunk, and Sweden and Denmark the branches. If I can get at the trunk, and hew it down, the branches fall of course
The naval force seemingly available to the
Northern Powers was of concern to the British government. It also received some
consideration from the second in command of the fleet dispatched to the Baltic
who saw, with his intuitive perception, what he thought the most advantageous
course to deal with the threat: ‘… I look upon the Northern League to be like a
tree, of which Paul was the trunk, and Sweden and Denmark the branches. If I
can get at the trunk, and hew it down, the branches fall of course; ‘ (4) Although
Nelson was not alone in this view the British Government first wanted to lop
the most suspect of the two branches, the King stipulating by negotiation if possible.
The Admiralty orders to Sir Hyde Parker additionally stated that, ‘… whether
the discussion supposed to be now pending with the Court of Denmark should be
terminated by an amicable arrangement, or by actual hostilities, the Officer
commanding the Fleet in the Baltic should, in either case, … proceed to
Revel;’ (5) One can speculate that if Nelson and not Hyde Parker had been the
Commander-in-Chief, he would indeed have turned a ‘blind eye’ – not to any
signal, but to the orders. Being on the spot, one imagines that he would have
sailed straight for Russian waters to destroy their fleet before the spring
thaw, leaving a smaller force to watch over the Swedes and the Danes.
The weakest link
The Russians had the largest of the Baltic
navies by 1801, approximately eighty-two ships-of-the-line, although it was to
prove that only thirty-one were actually ready for service; The Danes had
twenty-three, but in reality many of these were laid up in Copenhagen dockyard
undergoing a rebuilding, whilst others were hastily being readied as floating
batteries to face the British threat; the Swedes had about eighteen vessels,
well designed though many had been by their renowned naval architect, Fredrick
Henrik af Chapman. Much of this however was on paper and in the eye of politicians.
Practical seamen like Nelson, knew that in reality none of the Baltic navies,
plagued as they were by crew shortages, disease and inexperience, were in a
position to seriously oppose the Royal Navy individually – although they might pose
a threat if combined.
Despite some hostility shown towards Great
Britain by Sweden, she was seen as the weakest of the Northern Powers and,
consequently, perhaps the easiest to disengage from the League. However, in so
doing, she would be likely to receive considerable opposition from its other
members, particularly Russia. St. Vincent also alluded to Sweden’s position in
the orders to Sir Hyde Parker: ‘…but that, in the contrary supposition
(conceived to be not impossible) of this power relinquishing her present
hostile plans against the rights and interests of this Country, and of her
renewing, either singly or in concert with Denmark, her ancient engagements with
his Majesty, it will in such case be the duty of the said Officer to afford to
Sweden every protection in his power against the resentment and attacks of
Russia;’ (6)
Enemies on all sides
Napoleon Bonaparte had become master of Europe
by 1806. Unable to defeat Great Britain by force he then attempted to isolate her
economically, his Berlin and Milan Decrees being aimed at preventing her trade
with the continent. Ultimately however, Bonaparte’s scheme was self-defeating. Britain
retaliated with the Orders-in-Council and her position was further bolstered by
her world wide trading connections. European merchants too, despite Napoleon, strived
to continue in business and Sweden attempted to distance herself, seeing that
her own trade would be strangled. As had been foreseen however, both Denmark
and Russia became increasingly hostile. Denmark’s increased belligerence,
following the British bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807 and the capture of her
fleet, caused her to throw in her lot with the French Emperor. Additionally,
she was also found to be transporting stores and arms to Norway, with a view to
an attack on Sweden. Czar Alexander, temporarily on friendly terms with
Bonaparte following the Treaty of Tilsit, also threatened his neighbour to the
west and Sweden thus found herself faced by hostility on all sides.
Saumarez, the saviour
With an eye on the developing situation and a
view to protecting both her own vital trade and that of her one northern ally,
Great Britain sent a fleet to the Baltic in 1808 under Vice Admiral Sir James Saumarez,
flying his flag in Nelson’s old flagship Victory. The fleet, with at least
sixteen capital ships, was to be based intermittently at Wingo Sound off
Gothenburg. It was to be instrumental, during five crucial years, in protecting
both that country’s trade from French, Russian and Danish aggression and
ensuring the continuance of Great Britain’s maritime supplies. For his
distinguished services, Saumarez was awarded the Swedish Order of the Sword and
other honours by a grateful nation and Swedes came to regard him as the saviour
of their country. This fact is largely unknown in Sweden today, or indeed in
Great Britain, although the ‘Baltic Campaign’ has received rather better
coverage in recent years.
Sweden’s alliance with Great Britain was to be joined
by Alexander who, aided by the harsh Russian winter, turned against Napoleon Bonaparte.
Denmark, for her part, was to become bankrupt and effectively sidelined. Ironically
perhaps, it was a Danish officer who appeared to qualify Colonel Stewart’s
remark at the beginning of this article, regarding the silence maintained by
the Swedish batteries as the British fleet passed down the Kattegat on that late
March day in 1801. Writing some fifty years later, he maintained that they were
for the most part in a bad state of repair and that, with its being winter, the
ground had simply been too hard for others to be constructed.
1/2. ‘Narrative of Events Connected with the
Conduct of Lord Nelson in the Baltic, 1801’, Colonel William Stewart; ‘The
Dispatches and Letters of Lord Nelson’, Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, Vol. 1V,
p. 302.
3. ‘Nelson’, Carola Oman; Chapter X1V, p. 377,
(1950 edition).
4. Letter to the Right Honourable Henry
Addington; ‘The Dispatches and Letters of Lord Nelson,’ Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas,
Vol. 1V, p. 361.
5/6. ‘Orders to Admiral Sir Hyde Parker’,
Admiralty; ‘The Dispatches and Letters of lord Nelson,’ Sir Nicholas Harris
Nicolas, Vol. 1V, pp. 294, 295.
Rear Admiral James Saumarez. Painting by Philip Jean, National Portrait Gallery, London.
Czar Alexander I of Russia. Painting by Georg Dawe.
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